September 2007
Discovery Sanctions and a $15 Million Verdict in a Tire Case
By Kenneth J. Moran
The jury in a motorcycle tire case recently returned a $15 Million verdict against the defendant manufacturer in McCloud v. Goodyear Dunlop Tire North America, No. 04-1118, U.S.D.C. C. D. Ill., 2007 U.S. District LEXIS 62136 (August 23, 2007). In the middle of a three-week trial, the federal judge sanctioned the tire defendant for discovery abuse, and gave the jury a curative instruction about the failure to identify the tire’s inspector at the manufacturing plant. This may have played a part in the large jury verdict.
In prior discovery, plaintiff had requested the name of the inspector who examined the tire before it left the plant. The defendant responded that it “has not been able to identify the inspector of the subject tire.” In providing that response, however, the defendant did not describe how each tire was stamped with the inspector’s identifier as indicated in the documents provided to plaintiff. During trial, Goodyear’s witness testified to the procedures for inspection, including the identifying stamp. He mistakenly testified that the subject tire did not have a stamp, although the stamp was found to be present but unreadable.
The Court characterized Goodyear’s prior responses and testimony to be misleading, at best, and deliberately deceptive at worst. In reaching this conclusion, the Court imposed unreasonable discovery demands on parties in an adversary-style legal system.
Condemning a common discovery practice designed to avoid unnecessary disputes, the Court found that Goodyear should not have attempted to respond to plaintiff’s discovery after interposing an objection:
If Defendant had simply objected, Plaintiff could have filed a motion to compel and the Court would have resolved the issue. Instead, Defendant volunteered misleading information that deceived Plaintiff into believing that no motion to compel was necessary.
Furthermore, the court censured Goodyear’s reference to the inspector’s work instructions previously produced to counsel for plaintiff as providing the requested information. As the opinion itself notes: “On page eighty-six of this hundred page document, there is a mention that each tire is to have placed on its side an inspector’s identification number.” At trial, plaintiff’s counsel removed a deposition exhibit sticker from the tire and observed this stamp. Why plaintiff’s counsel could not have made this observation before trial remains unaddressed in the Court’s opinion.
Perhaps the most troublesome portion of the order is the burden the Court would impose as counsel defending depositions. Plaintiff’s counsel, who had prosecuted other tire cases against a variety of manufacturers, assumed that the key to identifying the inspector was to narrow the possible date of the tire’s manufacturer. The Court noted:
Defendant did nothing to correct this false impression at [corporate witness’] deposition . . . Defendant [should] have corrected Plaintiff’s false impression and shown them (sic) the means for possibly discovering the tire inspector’s identity.
In other words, defense counsel should have “corrected” the questions raised by plaintiff’s counsel, and the witness, ignoring what he was asked, should have answered his own questions. That is hardly the way an adversary system functions.
It remains to be seen whether this opinion will be cited in the future or whether Goodyear will appeal the verdict. Please contact our Tire Failure Litigation Team at Moran Reeves & Conn PC for further information.